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HAYS v. BRENNER: DOUBLE PATENTING,
OBVIOUSNESS AND THE TERMINAL
DISCLAIMER
Ruling for the first time on the limitations of the terminal disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. section 253,1 the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in Hays v. Brenner2 held that
such a disclaimer will not overcome an objection to patentability
based on obviousness under 35 U.S.C. section 103. 3 The Hays
patent application, which related to a pharmaceutical composition
useful in combating bronchial asthma, was rejected by the Patent
Office Examiner on the basis that the claims of the Hays application were not patentable over the claims of a patent issued to
Keating. Keating and Hays were co-employees of Wallace and Tierman, Inc., the assignee of both the Hays application and the Keating patent. The patent applications of Hays and Keating were copending in the Patent Office.
In connection with a petition for reconsideration of the decision
of the Patent Office Board of Appeals, Hays filed a terminal disclaimer and asked that the Board remand the appealed application
to the Examiner. The Board denied this petition. Thereafter,
Hays filed a petition to reopen the case with the Commissioner
because of the filing of the terminal disclaimer. This petition was
also denied.
The Examiner's and Board's rejection was upheld in the District Court for the District of Columbia. 4 The court found the
Hays application invalid on the grounds that the claims were not
1. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 253 (1952), as amended.
Disclaimer
Whenever, without any deceptive intention, a claim of a patent is invalid the remaining claims shall not thereby be rendered
invalid. A patentee, whether of the whole or any sectional interest therein, may, .

.

. make disclaimer of any complete claim, stat-

ing therein the extent of his interest in such patent.
claimer .

.

Such dis-

. thereafter be considered as part of the original patent

to the extent of the interest possessed by the disclaimant and by
those claiming under him.
In like manner any patentee or applicant may disclaim or dedicate to the public the entire term, or any terminal part of the
term, of the patent granted or to be granted. (Emphasis added).
2. 357 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
3. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1952).
Conditions for patentability: Non-obvious subject matter
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title,
if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented
and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains.
4. Hays v. Reynolds, 242 F. Supp. 206 (D.D.C. 1965).
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significantly distinct from the claims of the Keating patent and
that, in view of the Keating claims, the claimed material of the
Hays application was obvious to one skilled in the are.
On appeal to the circuit court, Hays contended that, although
the application's claims were obvious, the Hays application was
patentably distinct from the Keating claims and, therefore, a terminal disclaimer would overcome any rejection based on double
patenting. The circuit court did not rule upon appellant's contention. Instead, it said that since the application was obvious, the
terminal disclaimer would not overcome a rejection based on obviousness under 35 U.S.C. section 103.
In so doing, the court disagreed with the decisions of the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, In re Robeson5 and In re
Kaye.' These cases held that a terminal disclaimer could overcome a double patenting rejection based on obviousness since the
terminal dates of both patents would be the same, thereby eliminating any extension of the monopoly. However, the Hays court
did not use the words: "A terminal disclaimer will not overcome a
double patenting rejection based on obviousness." Rather, it employed the general language that a terminal disclaimer will not
overcome a rejection based on obviousness. Furthermore, it declared that this obviousness was based on 35 U.S.C. section 103.
All patent application rejections are predicated upon the same
Constitutional provision 7 and the same interpretation of that provision by the courts. There may be only one patent issuing for one
invention and its obvious extensions, modifications, and improvements.8
Under 35 U.S.C. sections 101, 102, a patent application will be
rejected if it discloses an invention which is the same as a prior
invention. 9 This rule applies to all applications including those
5. 141 U.S.P.Q. 485, 331 F.2d 610 (1964).
6. 141 U.S.P.Q. 829, 332 F.2d 817 (1964).
7.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
The Congress shall have power

. . .

to promote the progress

of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries.
8. Underwood v. Gerber, 149 U.S. 224 (1893).
9. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (1952).
§ 101 Inventions patentable
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.
§ 102 Conditions for patentability: novelty and loss of right to
patent
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country,
or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant
for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publi-
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rejected for double patenting."0
Usually section 103 has not been used, at least by name, as a
basis for determining the question of double patenting. The obviousness rejection relating to double patenting is not understood
to be the same obviousness rejection as under section 103." Section 103 is employed when there are applications by different inventors. Under this section the application which is filed last in
the Patent Office is declared obvious in view of the application or
patent of the first filed application or in view of the prior art in
general. "Prior art" from patents is that information made available in the disclosures and specifications of prior issued patents or
of disclosures and specifications given in a copending application by
another inventor if the reference application was filed prior to the
contested application.'- "Obviousness" has been interpreted to
mean that if a hypothetical individual, aware of all the information regarding the area covered by the patent application, were to
read the application, he would find the disclosed invention an obvious extension of the prior art. 3 When determining this obviousof the prior art applications or patents are not
ness, the claims
14
consulted.

A
ventor
1.
2.
3.

(e)

double patenting rejection is employed when the same inor common assignee has:
two copending applications,' 5 or
an application and a patent which were copending, 16 or
two issued patents that were copending. 17 Such situations
cation in this or a foreign country or in a public use or on
sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of
the application for patent in the United States, or

the invention was described in a patent granted on an appli-

cation for patent by another filed in the United States before
the invention thereof by the applicant for patent.
10. Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186 (1894).
11. In re Bowers and Orr, 149 U.S.P.Q. 570, 359 F.2d 886 (1966).
12. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1952).
13. Griffith Rubber Mills v. Hoffar, 313 F.2d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 1963). In
a case not involving double patenting, but involving a simple section 103
rejection the court said:
Thus the statute prescribes, as a condition of patentability, that
what has been accomplished must be such that it would not have
been obvious to a hypothetical person skilled in all that could have
been known, at the pertinent time, in the field to which the invention relates.
It follows that though a device may be new and useful, it is not
patentable if it consists of no more than a combination of ideas
which are drawn from the existing fund of public knowledge, and
which produces results that would be expected by one skilled in
the art.
14. In re Bowers and Orr, 149 U.S.P.Q. 570, 359 F.2d 886 (1966).
15. In re Baird, 146 U.S.P.Q. 579, 348 F.2d 974 (1965).
16. In re Heinle, 145 U.S.P.Q. 131, 342 F.2d 1001 (1965).
17. Southern Implement Mfg. Co. v. McLemore, 350 F.2d 244 (5th Cir.

1965).
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9

specie-genus, 2 0

23
comproduct-process, 22 apparatus-product,
2 4
bination-subcombination or element, and closely related inventive
concepts.2 5 In the first and second situations, the claims of the
application which are rejected are not allowed to issue as a patent.2 6 In the third, the claims of the patent which issued last are
27
held invalid.
2

process-apparatus, '

However, unlike the section 103 obviousness rejection, when
rejecting or invalidating a patent or application for double patenting, only the claims of the reference patent or application and the
claims of the contested application are compared to determine if
there has been double patenting. 28 The disclosures and specifications of the reference application or patent may not be considered in determining the obviousness or patentability of the contested application, because they are not prior art. 29 However, the
specifications and disclosures of the reference application or patent
may be used to determine what is being claimed therein, just as
the disclosures and specifications of the appealed application may
0
be used to determine what is being claimed in the application.
Section 103 has not been applied, therefore, as a test to determine double patenting since the disclosures and specifications, or
prior art, and not the claims are consulted under 103 in determining obviousness. Thus there is no statutory basis for a test to
determine double patenting, and since the double patenting rejection is applied not only where the same invention is claimed, but
also where extensions, modifications, and improvements have been
claimed,3 1 confusion and lack of uniformity have arisen as the
courts attempt to establish a workable test for determining if there
has, in fact, been double patenting.
18. In re Baird, 146 U.S.P.Q. 579, 348 F.2d 974 (1965).
19. In re Simmons, 136 U.S.P.Q. 203, 312 F.2d 822 (1963).
20. In re Coleman, 90 U.S.P.Q. 100, 189 F.2d 976 (1951).
21. In re Arendt, 24 U.S.P.Q. 203, 74 F.2d 765 (1935).
22. In re Taylor, 149 U.S.P.Q. 615, 360 F.2d 232 (1966); In re Bridgeford, 149 U.S.P.Q. 55, 357 F.2d 679 (1966).
23. Hope Basket Co. v. Product Advancement Corp., 89 F. Supp. 116
(W.D. Mich. 1950); afl'd 187 F.2d 1008 (6th Cir. 1951), cert. denied 342 U.S.
833 (1951).
24. American Communications Co. v. Pierce, 208 F.2d 763 (1st Cir.
1953).
25. Southern Implement Mfg. Co. v. McLemore, 350 F.2d 244 (5th Cir.
1965).
26. In re Robeson, 141 U.S.P.Q. 485, 331 F.2d 610 (1964).
27. Briggs v. M. & J. Diesel Locomotive Filter Corp., 228 F. Supp. 26
(E.D. Ill. 1964).
28. Briggs v. M. & J. Diesel Locomotive Filter Corp., supra note 27,
at 39.
29. In re Bowers and Orr, 149 U.S.P.Q. 570, 359 F.2d 886 (1966).
30. In re Greenlee, 106 U.S.P.Q. 104, 222 F.2d 739 (1955).
31. In re Kaye, 141 U.S.P.Q. 829, 332 F.2d 816 (1964).
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Subsequent to Hays the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
in In re Bowers and Orr,3 2 a case also involving a double patenting
rejection and a common assignee, distinguished Hays on the ground
that Hays was not decided upon double patenting theory, but rather
on the statutory basis of section 103. It said the Keating application was filed prior to the Hays application. Since it was an
application "by another" in compliance with section 102, it may be
considered prior art even though it was copending. 3 Therefore,
the disclosures and specifications may be used to determine obviousness under section 103. The Bowers court said that the Hays
decision was based upon the solicitor's argument which relied upon
the filing date of the Keating patent and the record of the District
Court for the District of Columbia which indicated that the court
relied upon the filing date of the Keating application in sustaining
the Examiner's rejection. Therefore, the Bowers court reasoned
that the Hays court was referring to a simple 103 rejection and
that the court was merely ruling upon the effect of using a terminal disclaimer to overcome a simple 103 rejection. The Bowers
court agreed that a section 103 obviousness rejection could not be
overcome by a terminal disclaimer, but disagreed with the proposition that a double patenting rejection based on obviousness also
could not be overcome by the use of the disclaimer.
Keating, however, had a basic application filed before Hays and
a continuation-in-part filed after Hays.3 4 It is not clear which
was used to reject the Hays application. As a consequence, both
double patenting language and section 103 language have been used
throughout the adjudication of the case. Therefore, the ultimate
question is not what the Bowers court thought the Hays court
should have said, but rather, what the Hays court was saying in
regard to double patenting.
The language of the district court's opinion does not support
the conclusion of the Bowers court:
The differences between the subject matter defined by
claim 14 of the Keating patent and that of claims 8 to 12
inclusive of the Hays' application at bar are such that the
claimed subject matter would have been obvious, at the
time the Hays' invention was made, to a person having
ordinary35 skill in the art to which such subject matter
pertains.
A comparison of claims is only necessary when the rejection is
based on double patenting.
Bowers further noted that Hays refused to rule upon the double patenting question by not deciding if the inventions were pat32.
33.
34.
35.

added).

149 U.S.P.Q. 570, 359 F.2d 886 (1966).
Hazeltine v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252 (1965).
In re Bowers and Orr, 149 U.S.P.Q. at 575, 359 F.2d at 890.
Hays v. Reynolds, 242 F. Supp. at 208 (D.D.C. 1965). (Emphasis
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entably distinct. What Bowers failed to note was that Hays established the test in section 103 as its basis for a double patenting
rejection. It was not using section 103 for a simple obviousness rejection based on the prior art. The Hays court said: "Since appellants' contention for patentability based on the filing of a
terminal disclaimer assumes obviousness, 103 is an absolute bar to
the grant of a patent. ' 36 The terminal disclaimer language indicates that the court was in the realm of double patenting and that
its reference to section 103 was a test for determining if double
patenting existed. It was not a reference to a simple 103 rejection.
If it had been, the court would not have disagreed with the opinions
in Robeson and Kaye which were clearly decided upon double
patenting theory.
Furthermore, the Hays court, in referring to the terminal disclaimer, said:
Without any legislative history to support it, an argument
is spun from this statute [referring to section 253] which
would provide sub silentio an exception to the injunction
of section 103 and allow, at best, double patenting in violation of 101 and at worst, the patenting of "inventions"
which would
not "promote the Progress of Science and use37
ful Arts"

The Hays court was indeed referring to double patenting in this
statement. The phrase, "an argument is spun," must, since there is
no other possible meaning, refer to those decisions relating to
double patenting which have allowed the disclaimer to overcome
certain double patenting rejections based on obviousness.
Hays interpreted section 253 relating to the terminal disclaimer:
The purpose of the 1952 amendment to § 253 apparently was to eliminate terminal problems in related patents
issued to the same inventor on different days through no
fault of his own. By filing a terminal disclaimer the
terminal dates of the patents can be made the same. It
certainly was not the purpose of the amendment to allow
assignees of patents to improve and expand their patent
positions by the expedient of limiting
the monopoly to the
38
terminaldates of priorpatents.

The implication is that the above statement should apply with
equal force to the same inventor where n- delay has occurred.
Clearly, Hays was establishing a more restricted use for the terminal disclaimer than the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
had allowed.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has said that double
patenting, if allowed, will extend the statutory monopoly.3 9 There36. Hays v. Brenner, 357 F.2d at 289.
37. Ibid.
38. Id. at 289-290. (Emphasis added).
39. In re Robeson, 141 U.S.P.Q. 485, 331 F.2d 610 (1964).
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fore, a terminal disclaimer eliminates the extension of the monopoly by making the terminal dates of the two patents the same.
The court, however, overlooked the equally compelling question of
patentability. If a patent application's claims do not meet the
standard established for patentability, then the right to exclude
others from the use of the information contained therein should
not be granted. Obvious extensions, modifications, and improvements are clearly not patentable under the existing law. 40 There
is only one standard for invention.41 Not all inventions are patentable, 42 and allowing an unpatentable invention to issue with a
shortened statutory monopoly is contrary to these basic rules of
patentability.
Monopoly has two dimensions, length and width. Though it
may be true that the length of the monopoly is not extended by
the use of the terminal disclaimer, it is just as true that the width
of the monopoly is extended if the unpatentable application claiming merely obvious extensions, is allowed to issue.
From the language of the Hays opinion and the language of the
district court's opinion, it is clear that the Hays court was referring
to the effect of the terminal disclaimer upon a double patenting
rejection based on obviousness.
Before a more detailed analysis of the implications of the instant case is possible, an investigation of the law relating to double patenting and the terminal disclaimer is necessary. This is followed by recommendations for establishing a uniform test to determine double patenting and for using the terminal disclaimer in
conformity with the overriding principles set forth by the Constitution, the statutes, and the courts.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE TEST FOR DETERMINING DOUBLE PATENTING

As was previously noted, there is no statutory test for determining double patenting. The courts have attempted to define
a workable test. The landmark decision in double patenting law is
Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co. 43 The United States Supreme Court held
that two patents may not issue for the same invention to the same
40.
41.

Underwood v. Gerber, 149 U.S. 224 (1893).
In re Isherwood, 46 App. D.C. 507 (D.C. Cir. 1917).

42. *In re Zickendaht, 138 U.S.P.Q. 22, 25-26, 319 F.2d 225, 229 (1963),

the concurring opinion of Judge Rich:
[W]hen I call something 'an invention' I do not imply that it is
patentable. Neither do the patent statutes. Note that 35 U.S.C. §
101 is entitled, 'Inventions patentable,' from which it is to be inferred that there are inventions which are not patentable. Similarly, section 103 refers to 'the invention' on which a patent 'may
not be obtained.' Section 102, in every paragraph except (f), refers
to 'the invention' which cannot be patented for one reason or another. To calling a thing an 'invention,' therefore, does not today
impute patentability.
43. Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186 (1894).
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inventor. Since Miller, all the case law has been an interpretation
of this doctrine.
1. The Second Circuit in Traitel Marble Co. v. U.T. Hungerford
Brass & Copper Co. 44 held that Miller applied only to a situation
where the claimed inventions were the same, and established the
rule that there was no double patenting if the claims of the copending applications, which had matured into issued patents, were
separate. Separate meant that the substance of the two application's claims was not the same. Whether the claims of the
application were obvious in view of the claims of the reference
application was not in question, nor was the question of whether the
claims of the application showed invention over the claims of the
reference application generally raised.
II. The Traitel doctrine was rejected by the Seventh Circuit
in Weatherhead Co. v. Drillmaster Supply Co. 45 The court adopted
the test that the claims of the second issued patent, which was
copending with the reference patent, had to show invention beyond the claims of the reference application or patent. This is to
say the claims had to be patentably distinct. If a patentable distinction could be found, there was no double patenting.
III. The test adopted by the federal courts in Weatherhead
was the test used by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals at
the time of the Weatherhead decision. This test for double patenting, first enunciated by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
in In re Isherwood,46 has recently been supplemented with variations on the theme. Isherwood, nonetheless, stands for the proposition that there shall be only one standard for invention. The
test for double patenting should be no more or no less strenuous
than the statutory tests for patentability.
IV. If the application claims material which is a "mere color48
able variation 47 or which differs only in scope from the referThese situaexists.
patenting
double
or
patent,
ence application
tions appear to be as close as one can get to claiming the same
invention in both applications.
V. It appears that the claims of the second application may be
49
This differ"different" from the claims of the first application.
ence test is much the same as the test defined in Traitel. If the
claims are merely different, double patenting exists, for "different"
has not meant that the claims or the contested application showed
44. 22 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1927), cert. denied 274 U.S. 753 (1927).
45. 227 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1955).
46. In re Isherwood, 46 App. D.C. 507 (D.C. Cir. 1917).
47. In re Siu, 105 U.S.P.Q. 428, 222 F.2d 267 (1955).
48. In re Bridgeford, 149 U.S.P.Q. 55, 357 F.2d 679 (1966); see also the
dissenting opinion of Judge Almond for a discussion of the filing of a later
application to obtain broader claims. In re Allen, 145 U.S.P.Q. 147, 153, 343
F.2d 482, 489 (1965).
49. In re Sarrett, 140 U.S.P.Q. 474, 327 F.2d 1005 (1964).
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invention over the reference application's claims or that the claims
of the second application were patentably distinct. Rather, "different" has meant that the claims of the second application were
"patentably indistinct."0
VI. There are also rejections based on obviousness.5' It is not
clear what test is applied in determining what is obvious under
double patenting theory. This test for obviousness is discussed in
a subsequent section. It appears, however, that some courts, instead of using obviousness as a separate test, have used obviousness as the basis in determining whether or not the claims are
patentably distinct.5 2 This degrades the obviousness test for double patenting to merely a criteria for determining a patentable distinction which in turn determines if double patenting exists.
VII. Another obviousness test is formulated on the basis of
whether the claims of the contested application were obvious in
view of the claims of the reference application and the prior art.
The courts usually stated that the application is rejected "particularly" or "especially" in view of the prior art. 53

This test will

also receive subsequent attention.
VIII. Still other tests which have enjoyed limited popularity
include:
1. Do the claims of the reference patent infringe the rejected
patent, and do the claims of the 54rejected patent infringe
the claims of the reference patent?
2. Is there a substantial dissimilarity between the claims? 5
3. Is there an extension of the monopoly? 56
5
4. Are different novel features present in the claims? T
5. Did the same Examiner deal with both patents?"
There is a distinct need for a uniform test for rejection.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE TERMINAL DISCLAIMER

The terminal disclaimer was made part of the patent law in
1952 as an amendment to 35 U.S.C. section 253.59 The courts have
50. In re Kaye, 141 U.S.P.Q. at 831, 332 F.2d at 819.
51. In re Dunn, 146 U.S.P.Q. 479, 349 F.2d 433 (1965); C. 0. Jelliff
Mfg. Corp. v. Watson, 187 F. Supp. 232 (D.D.C. 1960).
52. In re Ornitz, 146 U.S.P.Q. 38, 347 F.2d 586 (1965).
53. In re Ockert, 114 U.S.P.Q. 330, 245 F.2d 467 (1957); In re Eckel,
137 U.S.P.Q. 563, 317 F.2d 401 (1963).
54. In re Heffberger, 44 U.S.P.Q. 306, 309, 109 F.2d 237, 239 (1940);
footnotes 54 to 58 see CALVERT, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PATENT PRACTICE AND INVENTION MANAGEMENT 216 (1963).

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Technical Tape v. Minn. Mining, 143 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
In re Davis, 51 U.S.P.Q. 458, 123 F.2d 651 (1941).
Huges Tool v. United Machine, 35 F. Supp. 879 (N.D. Tex. 1939).
Ruben v. Ariston Labs, 40 F. Supp. 551 (N.D. Ill.
1941).
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 253 (1952), as amended.
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noted that the primary reason for a double patenting rejection is to
overcome the possibility of an extension of the monopoly over the
allowable statutory period of seventeen years.60 If a copending
application issues before the other application, there will be an extension of the monopoly if the second unpatentable application is
allowed to issue after the first issued patent. Therefore, a double
patenting rejection invalidates the claims of the application which
would last issue. By filing a terminal disclaimer, the expiration
dates of the patents can be made the same. Its use since its enactment has been limited, and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was the first court to rule upon its applicability.
It can be stated with some certainty that a terminal disclaimer
will not overcome a rejection based on the ground that the same
invention is claimed. As was said in In re Siu:
[S]ection 253 was intended to remedy certain difficulties
under the prior law encountered when an applicant, due to
factors beyond his control, could not cause related applications to issue on the same day...
However, while the disclaimer has the effect of permitting less close scrutiny of the distinctions between
claims issuing to an applicant in separate patents, it was
not and could not have been the legislative intent to permit
indiscriminate issuance of numerous patents directed to
mere colorable variations of the same invention."
This is the rule in both the circuit courts and the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals. The circuit courts have said that a second
patent for the same invention, though invalid because the monopoly
would be extended, would also be invalid because the power to create a monopoly had been exhausted. 62 Therefore, a terminal disclaimer has no effect since only one invention is claimed.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has chosen to view
the terminal disclaimer's versatility by degrees of patentability.
I. The court in Siu has held that a terminal disclaimer will
not overcome a double patenting rejection when the claims are
merely colorable variations.
II. However, the same court in Robeson allowed a terminal
disclaimer to overcome a double patenting rejection based on obviousness. The court said:
Where, as here, the claimed subject matter is an
obvious modification of what has already been claimed, a
second patent is contrary to one of the fundamental principles underlying the patent system, namely, that when
the right to exclude granted by a patent expires at the end
of the patent term, the public shall be free to use the in60. In re Robeson, 141 U.S.P.Q. 485, 331 F.2d 610 (1964).
61. In re Siu, 105 U.S.P.Q. at 430 n.2, 222 F.2d at 270 n.2.
62. Sterling Varnish Co. v. Lousis Allis Co., 145 F. Supp. 810 (E.D.
Wis. 1956), modified, 149 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Wis. 1957).
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vention as well as obvious modifications thereof or obvious
improvements thereon. Thus, to grant a second patent for
an obvious variation deprives the public of those rights.
If, however, the second patent expires simultaneously with
the first, the right to fully utilize the patented discovery at
the expiration date remains unimpaired. Thus, the terminal
63
disclaimer here precludes any extension of monopoly.
Thus, the disclaimer was extended in Robeson to the situation
where applications by the same inventor were obvious, and a
patent based upon something more than a mere colorable variation
was allowed to issue upon filing of the terminal disclaimer. The
Robeson court noted the admonishment in Siu of the other evils of
double patenting, 64 but it concluded that these evils were not a
potential hazard in the case. It did not state what the ruling might
be if one of the enumerated hazards were found in the background.
III. Subsequent to Robeson, the same court in Kaye reaffirmed its decision in Robeson by saying:

"In [Robeson] . . . we

held that where, as here, the claims define separate, albeit patentably indistinct, inventions, the filing of a terminal disclaimer may
obviate a double patenting rejection. '6 5 Kaye also involved applications of the same inventor.
IV. Bowers met the question of the limitations of the terminal
disclaimer in a common assignee situation head-on. Here the court
said that the question was "whether our decisions in Robeson and
Kaye . . . 'apply to the situation where a terminal disclaimer is

offered with respect to the commonly owned patent of a different
inventive entity.' "66 The court found that the distinction between
common inventorship and common assignee was "without legal
distinction." 67
In so finding, the court relied upon the language of section
253, the pertinent words being, "in like manner any patentee or
applicant .

.

.

,"

and the language of section 10068 which says:

"The word 'patentee' includes not only the patentee to whom the
patent was issued, but also the successors in title to the patentee."
As previously noted, the Hays court did not agree with that
particular interpretation of section 253. It said: "It certainly was
not the purpose of the amendment to allow assignees of patents
to improve and expand their patent positions by the expedient of
63. In re Robeson, 141 U.S.P.Q. at 488, 331 F.2d at 614.
64. In re Siu, 105 U.S.P.Q. at 429, 222 F.2d at 269:
The evils of double patenting where the two patents do not issue
on the same date include that of extension of monopoly but this is
not the only objection to double patenting. The pertinent statutes
do not, . . . warrant the allowance of more than one patent for
a single invention independently of the question of extension of
monopoly.
65. In re Kaye, 141 U.S.P.Q. at 831, 332 F.2d at 819.
66. In re Bowers and Orr, 149 U.S.P.Q. at 573, 359 F.2d at 889.
67. Ibid.
68. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 100 (1952).
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limiting the monopoly to the terminal dates of prior patents." 69
On its face, the language of Bowers and the statutes would
seem to refute the interpretation of Hays. That would be true if
section 253 is interpreted as meaning that a double patenting rejection may be overcome by the use of that section. In this matter of
interpretation of section 253, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals in Robeson relied upon the commentary of P. J. Federico:70
No specific reason for this provision [referring to 253] appears in the printed record, but its proponents contemplated that it might be effective, in some instances, in combating a defense of double patenting, to permit the patentee to cut back the term of a later issued patent so as to
expire at the same time as the earlier issued patent and
thus eliminate any charge of extension of monopoly. 7
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has predicated its
decisions to date upon this interpretation of section 253. The Hays
court, in replying to the statements of Federico, did not consider
his comments to be authority:
While the proponents of the 1952 amendment may be responsible for the suggestion [referring to the quote from
Frederico], apparently they were unable to have it included
in the legislative history of the amendment or in the statute itself. Certainly such unsupported and unadopted
suggestions cannot override the command of § 103 and the
cases which prohibit double patentline of Supreme Court
72
ing under any guise.

What possible effect upon the patentability of an application
can limiting its monopoly have? Patentability is not a function of
the length of the monopoly. A patent application must be inventive enough to stand on its own merits as a separate entity if it is
to issue. If it can not, because what is claimed is obvious, then,
like any other patent application, it must be rejected. It is difficult
to see what effect a shortened monopoly can have upon patentability. Is the claimed matter now more inventive? Is it less obvious
or more patentably distinct?
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, using its interpretation of section 253, has allowed patents to issue for inventions
where there was no patentable invention at all. Nothing can justify this position, for it is contrary to the basic rule that there
shall be only one patent issuing for one invention and its obvious
modifications, extensions and improvements. Nor does it comply
with the equally compelling rule that there shall be but one standard for invention, for a terminal disclaimer relaxes the standard
69. Hays v. Brenner, 357 F.2d at 290.
70. D. J. Federico acted as advisor to the Bryson subcommittee of the
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 82nd Congress, during the hearing of H.R. 3763, later H.R. 7794.
71. Patent Act Annotated, 35 U.S.C.A. 49 (1952).
72. Hays v. Brenner, 357 F.2d at 290.
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of invention to the point where only the same invention will be
rejected for double patenting.
Furthermore, by allowing obvious extension, improvements,
or modifications to issue, even with shortened monopolies, the
courts are substantially improving the inventor's or assignee's patent position. Though the inventor's or assignee's vertical monopoly
may not be extended, the shadow of his horizontal monopoly is
cast over a wider area. The following examples are helpful to illustrate the point.
I. Company X chooses to patent compound A and compound
B. The application for compound A is filed first. However, the
patent for compound B issues before the application of compound A
is allowed to issue. Compounds A and B are obvious in view of
each other in both the section 103 sense and the double patenting
sense. Compound A is rejected for double patenting because the
claims of A were obvious in view of the claims of B. Double patenting is used because compound B is not prior art as to compound
A. Company X files a terminal disclaimer and compound A is allowed to issue for the length of the monopoly granted to compound
B.
What if the patent for compound A had issued first? Compound B would have been rejected, not for double patenting, but
for obviousness under section 103 because compound A could be
used as prior art. The terminal disclaimer would have been to no
avail. Compound B receives no patent protection.
In the first instance, two patents have issued. In the second
instance, only one. The terminal disclaimer has allowed Company
X to gain new patent protection.
II. Inventor X files an application for compound A and subsequently files an application for compound B. A patent issues for
compound A. Compound B is rejected for double patenting. Inventor X files a terminal disclaimer and compound B issues.
In a different situation, inventor X files an application for
compound A. Inventor Y files an application for compound B.
Compound A issues as a patent. Since compound A was first filed
and an invention by another, it is prior art as to the application of
compound B. Compound B is rejected under section 103.
Here again two patents have issued in one situation while only
one issued in another. The reason for this is the use of the terminal
disclaimer. Two patents have issued, not because both were patentable, but because they fell into a unique situation. If there is
to be only one standard for invention, it is not clear now that dictate is met here.
It may be argued that in double patenting only the claims are
consulted, and, therefore, the determination of patentability does
not include the disclosures as prior art. That is to say that simply
because the disclosures are obvious, it does not follow that the
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claims are going to be obvious. However, regardless of how patentability is determined, the result is that with the use of the
terminal disclaimer, two patents issue with their respective disclosures and claims where two patents would not have issued were
there different inventive entities without a common assignee.
It is possible that other interests could not make use of the
obvious extensions in the above examples without infringing the
first issue patents because of the doctrine of equivalents.7 3 Regardless of this possibility, allowing patents to issue for the obvious
extensions materially expand the patent positions of the common
assignee or inventor. When the obvious extensions issue, their
equivalents are immediately protected. The equivalent of the first
issued patent is not necessarily the equivalent of the obvious extension. Therefore, when an obvious extension is allowed to issue,
even though it is allowed only a limited vertical monopoly, other
interests are prohibited from using the equivalent of what is unpatentable. In example I above the terminal disclaimer allowed
compound A to issue. If A were not allowed to issue, other interests could not receive a patent for compound A if it is disclosed by
Company X, but at least other interests could use the equivalents
of compound A if they were not also equivalents of compound B.
A graphical example is helpful here.
2
3

2

1

2

3

2

rn the above diagram:
1. Area 1 is the patent protection given by the claims of
compound B.
2. Area 2 is the area given protection through the doctrine of
equivalents for compound B.
3. Area 2 is the patent protection given by the claims of compound A. For purposes of this example the obvious claims
of compound A are the same as the equivalents of compound B.
4. Area 3 is the area given protection through the doctrine of
equivalents for compound A. This area was not protected
by the patent for compound B. Compound A was an obvious extension. It should not have been patentable, yet
it was allowed to issue with a shortened period of monop73. The doctrine of equivalents states that there will be infringement
of the claims of an issued patent if another device, method or the like performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to
obtain the same result. Paul E. Hawkinson Co. v. Skegno-Gamble, Inc., 20
F. Supp. 543 (D. Minn. 1937).
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oly. The length of Company X's monopoly is not extended,
but the width is extended, and it is extended to the detriment of the public. The above situation applies with equal
force to the second example involving the same inventor.
Finally, the situation becomes more critical where three or four
related applications are copending. With each application that is
allowed to issue by use of the terminal disclaimer, the patent position of the inventor or assignee becomes more enviable. Patents
issue where there has been no invention to the detriment of the
public.
In March of 1966 the Commissioner of Patents in an address to
the examining corps said:
The most difficult question which we face in most
cases is 'Does the application present an invention that is
unobvious to a person having ordinary skill in the pertinent art'? . . . . Further, if the examiner is satisfied that
the claimed invention is clearly obvious in view of the
teaching of the prior art, to a person having ordinary skill
in the pertinent art, then a patent should not be granted
even if affidavits, terminal disclaimers, and the like are
presented by the applicant, since such papers cannot
change what is obvious so it may
become unobvious and
4
therefore a patentableinvention.'
Furthermore, there is a very real problem created when the
common assignee is a corporation which specializes in obtaining
patents for the individual inventor and is incorporated for that
purpose alone. Though such a corporation may in fact be the
common assignee to patents by different inventors, nonetheless its
purpose is to sell the assigned patent to the highest bidder. Under
such an operation it is not difficult to imagine two patents, issuing
to this assignee under the benefit of the terminal disclaimer, and
then each patent being sold to a different party. If the claims of
the two patents are obvious in view of each other's claims, are the
two subsequent assignees to institute suit to determine who has the
right to exclude? Or, is a licensee of one of the two subsequent
assignees required to obtain another license from the other assignee so that he may make, use, or sell without infringing? It is a
basic precept that the law abhors creating law suits, yet it is not
improbable that the suggested use as enumerated in Bowers will
lead to just that result.
THE BASIS OF DOUBLE PATENTING REJECTIONS AS IT

RELATE:

TO SECTION 103

As has been previously noted, the circuit courts and the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals have relied upon various tests to
determine if double patenting exists. An obviousness rejection under section 103 is based on the test of what one skilled in the art
74.

825 O.G. Pat. Off. 826, 827.

(Emphasis added.)
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would deem obvious at the time the invention was made if he were
aware of all the information available in the prior art. However,
in those double patenting cases where obviousness has been a basis
for rejection, the test for obviousness has been unclear. As an
example of a definition of the test, Bowers said:
While in those cases we held that an 'obvious' type
double patenting rejection could be overcome by filing a
terminal disclaimer, that does not mean that a section 103
rejection for obviousness may be similarly overcome. Under section 103 a reference patent is available for all it
fairly discloses to one of ordinary skill in the art. There is
no inquiry as to what is claimed therein. In the obviousness type of double patenting rejections, the test is not
what would be obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art
from reading the specifications or the claims. Rather, the
inquiry is much more limited in nature and the patent is
considered only to compare the invention defined in the
patent 75
claims with the invention defined in the application
claims.
The last sentence above should be compared with a quote from

In re Sarrett.76

The first sentence of the Bowers' quote is drawn

from Sarrett, and that sentence is immediately followed in Sarrett
by: "We are not here concerned with what one skilled in the art
would be aware from
reading the claims, but with what inventions
'77
the claims define.
Taken in the proper context, therefore, the language of the
Bowers court confuses the issue. Sarrett is cited for the proposition
that it is a rejection of the obviousness test for double patenting
and an example of the "difference test. '78 The "difference test"
does not require that there be invention shown by the second application's claims over the reference application's claims.79 The
difference test is not the obviousness test. Claims to a patent may
claim a separate or different invention while at the same time the
claims are obvious in view of the claims of the reference application.
However, a terminal disclaimer will overcome a double patenting
rejection when the claims are rejected as being merely different.80
Other courts have relied upon the test of whether or not the
claims of the second application were patentably or significantly
distinct. Double patenting does not exist if there is a patentable
distinction since both application's claims can exist on their own
merits.8 '
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
1955).

In re Bowers and Orr, 149 U.S.P.Q. at 575 n.7, 359 F.2d at 891 n.7.
In re Sarrett, 140 U.S.P.Q. 474, 327 F.2d 1005 (1964).
Id. at 481, 327 F.2d at 1013. (Emphasis added.)
In re Allen, 145 U.S.P.Q. 147, 153, 342 F.2d 482, 489 (1965).
In re Sarrett, 140 U.S.P.Q. 474, 327 F.2d 1005 (1964).
In re Kaye, 141 U.S.P.Q. 829, 332 F.2d 816 (1964).
Weatherhead Co. v. Drillmaster Supply Co., 227 F.2d 98 (7th Cir.
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In In re Ornitz the test for determining a patentable distinction was defined:
[I] n determining whether there is a patentable difference,
prior art may be considered, just as it is considered on a
simple section 103 'obviousness' rejection, but that fact does
not convert a double patenting rejection to a simple section 103 rejection so as to exclude consideration8 2 of patents
issued on applicant's own copending application.
In In re Borah the patentable distinction test was "whether such
differences would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the
art. '8 3 The courts have made two statements about a patentable
distinction. First, they have said there must be a patentable distinction, without clarifying what the phrase means. 4 Second, they
say that a patentable distinction is to be determined by inquiring
whether the claims would have been obvious in view of the reference application's claims to one skilled in the art.85
In effect the courts are saying that a patentable distinction is
equivalent to unobviousness even though they sometimes use obviousness as a test for determining a patentable distinction. Furthermore, this obviousness test is predicated upon the wording of
section 103 to the extent that the inquiry is what one skilled in the
art could conclude from reading the claims.
Other decisions have rejected applications for double patenting
if the rejected application claimed material that was obvious in
view of the claims of the reference application or patent and the
prior art.8 6

This test complies with the two basic patentability

doctrines. There shall be only one patent issuing for one invention and its obvious extensions, modifications, and improvements;
and there shall be only one standard for invention. As has been
noted, not all inventions are patentable.8 7 Therefore, since the
patent law has been endowed with a statutory test which required
rejection of those patent applications which fail to comply with the
statute, that same test should be carried into the area of double
patenting as the only test for determining double patenting when
extensions, modifications, or improvements are being claimed.
It is submitted that the test should be: "Are the claims of the
second application obvious in view of the claims of the reference
patent and the prior art to one skilled in the art?" This is unlike
the statutory test of section 103 in one respect. Here the disclosures in the reference application or patent may not be used as
prior art. The dictate of the Supreme Court has been that there
82.
83.
84.
F. Supp.
85.
86.
87.

In re Ornitz, 146 U.S.P.Q. 38, 40, 347 F.2d 586, 590 (1965).
148 U.S.P.Q. 213, 220, 354 F.2d 1009, 1018 (1966).
Superior Concrete Accessories v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 246
104 (W.D. Mo. 1965).
In re Ornitz, 146 U.S.P.Q. 38, 347 F.2d 586 (1965).
In re Ockert, 114 U.S.P.Q. 330, 245 F.2d 467 (1957).
In re Zickendaht, 138 U.S.P.Q. 22, 319 F.2d 225 (1963).
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shall be only one patent for one invention and its obvious extensions, modifications, and improvements. What better way is there
to comply with this dictate when determining if double patenting
exists than to evaluate the claims of the second application in view
of the claims of the reference application and the prior art?
THE CONTINUED USE OF THE TERMINAL DISCLAIMER

The current use of the terminal disclaimer violates the patentability rules. Thus, if the disclaimer is to be used at all, it must be
used in such a way that these basic rules are not violated. The
following recommendations attempt to comply with those precepts.
Certainly, whenever sections 102 and 103 may be employed to
reject an application by a separate inventive entity from the reference application or patent, they should be so utilized.
Under current practice when one of two copending applications
issues as a patent, that patent is considered the fulcrum upon
which the question of double patenting for the other application
turns. It is of no consequence that the inventor or assignee wanted
his first filed application to issue first. If the second filed application issues first, then the first filed may be rejected for double
patenting. Considering the issued patent the fulcrum does not
appear to be a realistic approach to the problems created by double
patenting.
A better rule would allow the assignee or inventor an option
upon a double patenting rejection. First, he could choose to retain
the first issued patent. The rejected application would remain invalid. Alternatively, he could choose to disclaim the conflicting
claims of the first issued patent and retain patent protection for the
patent application which was rejected by disclaiming a portion of
its term to coincide with the term of the first issued patent. The
terminal disclaimer under this rule is used constructively and
equitably.
This rule gives the patentee the option of deciding for which
inventive concept he would rather have patent protection. If his
chief interest is in the first issued patent, the invalidation, for
double patenting, of the second application works no harm upon
the patentee nor conflicts with the patent laws. If his chief interest
is in the second application, this rule allows him to gain patent
protection for the invention without violating the patentability
rules. Disclaiming the claims of the first issued patent removes the
patent protection granted those claims. Therefore, when the second application issues, only one patent is issuing for one invention.
Disclaiming the terminal portion of the second application removes
the possibility of a vertical extension of the monopoly. The horizontal extension is likewise curtailed, since the claims and the
equivalents of the first issued patent have been disclaimed. The
rule is particularly applicable to improvement applications, the
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cause of acute double patenting problems, 8 and to delay in the
Patent Office.
CONCLUSION

It is submitted that the use of the terminal disclaimer by the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to overcome double patenting
rejections is in violation of the patentability rules. The terminal
disclaimer allows an inventor or assignee to improperly improve
his patent position by granting patents for obvious extensions,
modifications, and improvements. It also creates a double standard
for invention by relaxing the patentability requirements in a double
patenting setting to the point where only the same invention or
colorable variations will be rejected for double patenting. The
Hays decision complies with the underlying principles of the patent
law that there shall be only one patent for one invention and its
obvious extensions, modifications, and improvements, and it should
be the controlling rule in regard to the terminal disclaimer.
To comply with the patentability rules, the terminal disclaimer
could be used to disclaim a terminal portion of the second issued
patent to coincide with the term of the first issued patent. In
conjunction with this, the conflicting claims of the first issued
patent should be disclaimed. The test for determining if double
patenting exists should be standardized as follows: "Are the claims
of the application obvious in view of the claims of the reference
application (or patent) and the prior art to one skilled in the art?"
This inquiry would create one standard of invention in compliance with the clear dictate of the better reasoned decisions and the
statutes."
GARY R. MYERS
88. H. Marans, 36 J.P.O.S. 207 (1954).
89. The following is the Commissioner's recommended solution: 834
O.G. 1615 (1967).
Double Patenting
In view of the uncertain situation which has arisen as a result
of recent decisions dealing with 'double patenting' it is thought to
be advisable to restate the practice which should be followed in
this area, particularly as regards the effect of terminal disclaimers.
The term 'double patenting' is properly applicable only to cases involving two or more applications and/or patents of the same inventive entity and should not be applied to situations involving
commonly owned cases of different inventive entities. Sole and
joint inventors cannot constitute a single entity, nor do two or more
sets of joint inventors constitute a single entity, nor do two or more
sets of joint inventors constitute a single entity if any individual is
included in either set who is not also included in the other.
If two or more cases are filed by a single inventive entity, and
if the expiration dates of the patents, granted or to be granted, are
the same, either because of a common issue date or by reason of
the filing of one or more terminal disclaimers, two or more patents
may properly be granted, if the claims do not overlap, even though
the subject matter to which the claims of one case are directed may
be obvious in view of the subject matter claimed in the other case.
In re Robeson, 1964 D.C. 561, 141 USPQ 485; In re Kaye, 1964 C.D.
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630, 141 USPQ 829. Claims overlap within the meaning of this
statement if it is possible for them to be infringed by the same process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. Cross reading is not necessary to constitute such an overlap.
Overlapping claims should not be allowed in cases filed by the
same inventive entity if they are directed to identical inventive
concepts, or if the concept to which one set of claims is directed
would be obvious in view of that to which the other set is directed.
This is true regardless of the relative filing dates of the cases or
the relative scope of the claims.
In situations involving cases filed by different inventive entities, regardless of ownership, Section 102 and 103 of 35 U.S.C.
preclude the granting of two or more patents when directed to
identical inventive concepts or when one of the concepts would be
obvious in view of the other. A terminal disclaimer can have no
effect in this situation since the basis for refusing more than one
patent is not connected with any extension of monopoly.
In view of 35 U.S.C. 135, it is necessary to determine priority
of invention whenever two different inventive entities are claiming
a single inventive concept, and this determination should ordinarily be made before any patent is issued. This is true regardless of
ownership, and the provision of Rule 201(c) that interferences will
not be declared or continued between commonly owned cases unless
good cause is shown therefor does not mean that two patents are to
be allowed in such cases, but that the common assignee should be
called on to state which of the entities involved is prior to the other
in date of invention.
Accordingly, the assignee of two or more cases of different
inventive entities, containing conflicting claims, should be called on
to maintain a line of demarcation between them. If such a line is
not maintained then, when one of the cases is in condition for allowance, claims covering the conflicting subject matter should be
suggested as provided in Rule 203, care being taken to insure that
such claims cover all the conflicting matter and the assignee should
be called on to state which entity is the prior inventor of that subject matter and to limit the claims of the other application accordingly. If the assignee does not comply with this requirement and
presents the interfering claims in both cases, an interference should
be declared, attention being directed to Rule 208 if there is a common attorney. If suggested claims are not presented within the
time allowed, rejection should be made on the ground of disclaimer
as indicated in Rule 203 (b).
In the event that a common assignee, after taking out a patent
on one of two or more applications, for the first time presents
claims in a pending application which are not patentably distinct
from claims of the patent, the claims of the application should be
rejected on the ground that the assignee, by taking out the patent
at a time when the application was not claiming the patented invention, is estopped to contend that the patentee is not the prior
inventor.
If a patent is inadvertently issued on one of two commonly
owned applications by different inventive entities which at the time
when the patent issued were claiming inventions which are not
patentably distinct, the assignee should be called on to make a determination of priority as in the case of pending applications and,
if no election is made, an interference should be declared. An election of the applicant as the first inventor should not be accepted
without a complete (not terminal) disclaimer of the conflicting
claims in the patent.

